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In Burr v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., the respondent, after consum-
ing three swallows from a drink bottled by the appellant, detected an
odd, powdery, flat taste. After examining the remaining contents, she
found a foreign substance or wad in the liquid.' Approximately two
hours later, she became nauseated and, thereafter, suffered from diar-
rhea and chest pains. 2 The court noted that the time lapse between the
drinking of the beverage and a subsequent illness was not necessarily
controlling, but in the principal case a lapse of two hours between
consumption and illness negated the inference that the respondent's
illness was proximately caused by drinking the alleged deleterious
substance, especially since nausea and diarrhea are often produced by
other causes. The court felt a directed verdict should have been awarded
appellant at the trial stage.
3
Since only one reasonable inference could be drawn from the evi-
dence, the court in Campbell v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,4 felt a
directed verdict should have been awarded appellant at trial. The res-
pondent, while filling a tire tube manufactured by appellant, was in-
jured when the tire tube exploded. The court held that the respondent
failed in his burden of proving that a defect existed in the tube because
of faulty and negligent manufacturing. The tire was examined by an
independent expert furnished by the appellant, who testified that after
a thorough inspection he found no defect in the chemical composition,
tensile strength, or stretch quality of the tire.
II. SUDDEN EMERGENCY
In Still v. Blake,- the respondent's act of swerving in the left lane
of traffic when confronted with a sudden emergency was submitted to
the jury to determine whether this amounted to negligent and reckless
I. 181 S.E.2d478 (S.C. 1971).
2. The contents of the bottle were not chemically analyzed and the doctor's report
did not speculate on the cause of illness.
3. See Fowler v. Coastal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 252 S.C. 579, 167 S.E.2d 572
(1969).
4. 182 S.E.2d 73 (S.C. 1971).
5. 255 S.C. 95, 177 S.E.2d 469 (1970).
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conduct.6 The court reiterated its position that one confronted with a
sudden emergency is not held to the same standard of conduct as a
person who has time to contemplate alternative courses of action. If
the emergency was not created by the driver, the choice made, even
though not the wisest, frees him from liability if a reasonable man of




The plaintiff has the burden of proving the dangerous propensities
of an animal showing that the owner either knew or should have known
that the particular animal had a vicious disposition. In Giles v.
Russell,8 the plaintiff was thrown off a motorcycle after colliding with
a dog owned by the defendant. The evidence indicated the dog had
chased the motorcycle in a threatening manner and the court affirmed
a judgment for the plaintiff, feeling the question was properly left with
the jury to decide whether the owner had sufficient knowledge of the
dangerous characteristics of his dog to constitute negligence in failing
to keep the dog restrained. Since the characteristics of an animal are
likely to remain constant, evidence of the dog's viciousness subsequent
to the accident was allowed to be introduced.
IV. RELEASE
In Bartholomew v. McCartha,9 the South Carolina Supreme
Court followed the trend of authority and held that the release of one
tort-feasor does not automatically release other tort-feasors. The con-
trolling test should be the intention of the parties, unless the plaintiff
has, in fact received full compensation amounting to a satisfacton.'0
6. Id. at 99, 177 S.E.2d at 47 1. The respondent testified that the appellant had given
a right turn signal prior to reaching an intersection, but at the last minute made a sudden
left turn. The respondent, anticipating a right turn in accordance with the alleged signal,
intended to pass through the intersection simultaneously with appellant's turning right
and clearing the lane, but when confronted with the abrupt left turn, swerved his vehicle
unsuccessfully in the hope of avoiding a collision.
7. McVey v. Whittington, 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E.2d 92 (1966); Elrod v. All, 243
S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410 (1964).
8. 180S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1971).
9. 179 S.E.2d 912 (S.C. 1971).
10. The common law rule held that the release of one tort-feasor released all, even
if the releasor expressly reserved his rights against the other tort-feasors. This doctrine
rested upon the theory that a release implied a satisfaction and that there should only be
one recovery for ajoint wrong. See 73 A.L.R.2d 403 (1960).
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V. DUTY OF CARE
In Still v. Blake," the court reaffirmed its position that a forward
vehicle is in no better position from a liability standpoint than a follow-
ing vehicle. Both drivers are expected to exercise due care under the
circumstances. 2 Whether the rear vehicle in this case was following too
close was a question of fact for the jury.
In Bootle v. Labrasca,13 the plaintiff was injured when she fell in
defendant's restaurant. The court, affirming a judgment for the plain-
tiff, held that the jury was the proper body to determine if the defendant
failed to adequately light or otherwise warn of a step down between
adjacent dining areas and if the plaintiff was conjributorily negligent
in failing to detect the condition.
VI. STATUTORY DUTY OF CARE
In Harris v. Marion Concrete Co.," the supreme court restated its
position that in South Carolina, violation of a statute is negligence per
se. 15 In Harris the plaintiffs were injured when the defendant-owned
truck ran through a red traffic light, causing a collision. In affirming
judgment for the plaintiffs, the court held that the defendant had viol-
ated sections 46-306 and 46-3611" of the Code of Laws of South Caro-
lina relating to traffic control signals and maximum speed limits.
In Hightower v. Greenville County, 7 the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion for personal injuries when the car in which she was a passenger
struck a hole in a blacktop road maintained by the county." The right
II. 255 S.C. 95, 177 S.E.2d 469 (1970).
12. Oliver v. Blakeney, 244 S.C. 565, 137 S.E.2d 772 (1964).
13. 255 S.C. 134, 177 S.E.2d 544 (1970).
14. 320 F. Supp. 16 (D.S.C. 1970).
15. Bell v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 202 S.C. 160, 24 S.E.2d 177 (1943); Eickhoff
v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d 153 (1942); Worrell v. South Carolina
Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 195 S.E. 638 (1938).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-306 (1962) states that a green signal means "go," a
yellow signal means "caution," and a red signal means "stop." S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-
361 (1962) states: a person should drive no faster than is reasonable and prudent and
• . . [ijn every event speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding
with any person, vehicle or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance
with the legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.
17. 255 S.C. 192, 177 S.E.2d 785 (1970).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-921 (1962) provides:
Any person who shall receive bodily injury or damage in his person or
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front wheel of the automobile was severed from the car and the plaintiff
was thrown against the steering wheel and injured. A sewer cut had
been made across the road on or about September 4, 1968. Thereafter,
the cut was filled and tamped. The County Supervisor was apparently
notified of the excavation in September, 1968, and was aware that the
cut would leave soft, though tamped dirt in the roadway. The county
made no inspection of the road until February 27, 1969, the date of
the accident. By this time, the sewer cut had naturally become sunken
or concave, although testimony differed as to the exact depth of the cut.
The court felt the jury was warranted in concluding that the defect had
existed for a sufficient length of time to put the county on constructive
notice of it, and that the county was negligent in failing to remedy the
defect.
In a similar case, Hammet v. City of Spartanburg,5 the plaintiff
was allowed to recover for personal injuries after his car allegedly hit
a hole in a street maintained by the city, causing him to depress the
accelerator pedal, lose control of his automobile, and strike a tree.
Although section 47-70 of the Code 0 places the burden on the plaintiff
to prove his freedom from contributory negligence when bringing an
action against a municipal corporation, the issue of contributory neg-
ligence was for the jury to determine.
VII. FAMILY PURPOSE AND JOINT ENTERPRISE DOCTRINES
In Lollar v. Dewitt2 the appellant was injured when a mule-drawn
wagon, upon which she was riding, was struck in the rear by respon-
dent's vehicle. The appellant alleged in her complaint that the respon-
dent was operating his vehicle in a careless and reckless manner. The
respondent alleged in his answer, by way of a fourth defense, that
appellant's husband, the driver of the wagon, was contributorily negli-
gent and that his negligence should be imputed to the appellant under
the family purpose and joint enterprise doctrines. At appropriate stages
of the trial, the appellant moved to strike the fourth defense from the
answer but this motion was denied. In reversing the lower court's
sioned by the neglect or mismanagement of the county, may recover in an
action against the county the amount of actual damage sustained by him
by reason thereof, provided such person has not in any way brought about
such injury or damage by his own act or negligently contributed thereto.
19. 179 S.E.2d 614 (S.C. 1971).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-70 (1962).
21. 179 S.E.2d 607 (S.C. 1971).
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decision, the supreme court held that the defenses of the family purpose
doctrine and joint enterprise theory should have been striken in accor-
dance with appellant's motion. Although South Carolina recognizes the
family purpose rule, 22 the record failed to disclose evidence that the
appellant owned the mule and wagon and furnished them for family
purposes, a prerequisite to the application of the doctrine. The joint
enterprise theory was also inapplicable because in order to impute
negligence from a driver to a passenger the latter must have some
direction and control over the progress and management of the vehi-
cle.23 In Lollar no evidence was introduced to show that appellant had
such control over the movement of the wagon.
VIII. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK
In Ruth v. Lane 4 the plaintiff-employee was severely burned while
using an acetylene torch. The defendant relied on the defenses of contri-
butory negligence and assumption of risk and treated them inter-
changeably. The court noted that there had been considerable confu-
sion in the past concerning the two defenses, but in Ruth, since the jury
below found the employer negligent, the defense of assumption of risk
was inapplicable because "assumption of risk, in its true sense, rests
in contract, not tort."
22. Reid v. Swindler, 249 S.C. 483, 154 S.E.2d 910 (1967); Porter v. Hardee, 241
S.C. 474, 129 S.E.2d 131 (1963); Norwood v. Coley, 235 S.C. 314, 111 S.E.2d 550
(1959); Hewitt v. Fleming, 172 S.C. 266, 173 S.E. 808 (1934); Burbage v. Curry, 127
S.C. 349, 121 S.E. 267 (1923); Mooney v. Gilreath, 124 S.C. 1, 117 S.E. 186 (1923);
Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S.C. 171, 81 S.E. 487 (1914).
23. Spradley v. Houser, 247 S.C. 208, 146 S.E.2d 621 (1966); Ray v. Simon, 245
S.C. 346, 140 S.E.2d 575 (1965).
24. 254 S.C. 451, 175 S.E.2d 820 (1970).
25. Cooper v. Mayes, 234 S.C. 491,495-96, 109 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1959) distinguished
the two defenses:
Assumption of risk, in its true sense, rests in contract, not tort. A true case
of assumption of risk arises when an employee, without negligence on his
part or that of his employer, is injured as the result of a hazard ordinarily
incident to the proper performance of the duties of his employment. When
by his own negligence the employee increases the hazard to which his work
would normally expose him, and as a result of such negligence and not of
any negligence of his employer sustains injury from the abnormal hazard
which he has thus created, he is barred from recovery by his own negli-
gence. Where the extraordinary hazard is attributable to the employer's
negligence, but would not have caused the injury except for the negligence
of the employee, the bar to recovery is not assumption of risk, but con-
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But in Canady v. Martschink Beer Distributors, Inc.,"5 the court
restated its position that the defense of assumption of risk could be used
in a "factually appropriate" tort action, the key not being contract,
but consent.2Y Canady was an action brought by a guest passenger
against the driver of an automobile. The court inferred from the evi-
dence that the driver was under the influence of intoxicants, and that
the plaintiff voluntarily chose to remain in the car; therefore, the issue
of contributory negligence and recklessness should have been sub-
mitted to the jury.2 The facts of this case did not, however, warrant
the defense of assumption of risk.
In Blout v. McCrory Construction Co.2" the defendant, in the
process of remodeling a department store, had placed a two by four
shoe or footing across the bottom of a doorway being eliminated. At
the store's request, the passageway was temporarily left unsealed to
allow employees to conduct business in the adjoining room. The plain-
tiff, her attention being diverted while examining a customer's check,
tripped and fell over the shoe. The court reasoned that since the em-
ployee had traveled through the opening on numerous occasions, she
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The fact that the
plaintiff had momentarily forgotten the danger because she was study-
ing the check, was not considered to be an adequate rebuttal to the
charge of contributory negligence. Summarizing from the authorities
the court stated:
While forgetfulness of, or inattention to, a known danger may
under certain circumstances be excused, it is recognized that a too
liberal application of the principle can result in fraud and could
completely destroy the defense of contributory negligence. There-
fore, it is settled that mere forgetfulness or inattention if insuffi-
cient. . . . In order to keep forgetfulness of, or inattention to, a
rights of an injured employee against his employer, the issue moves from
the field of contract into that of tort. Attempt in such cases to interrelate
assumption of risk and contributory negligence is more academic than
practical, and sometimes loses sight of the fact that the difference between
the two is fundamental and not merely of degree.
26. 255 S.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 475 (1970).
27. Baker v. Clark, 233 S.C. 20, 103 S.E.2d 395 (1958).
28. Since the plaintiff was a guest passenger he could recover against the defendant
only upon sustaining his burden of proof that the defendant had acted recklessly or
intentionally. Thus plaintiff's contributory negligence would not defeat recovery, unless
it amounted to a reckless disregard for his own safety. Benbow v. Davis, 248 S.C. 402,
150 S.E.2d 235 (1966).
29. 254 S.C. 208, 176 S.E.2d 407 (1970).
[Vol. 23
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known danger from constituting contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law, the evidence must be such as to give rise to a reasonable
inference that the forgetfulness or inattention relied upon was in-
duced by some immediate and adequate disturbing cause, to be
determined in the light of the exigencies of the situation and the
facts and circumstances of the particular occasion.30
Since the plaintiff's distraction was self-created and not the product of
outside influences, the court concluded that she simply failed to exercise
due care for her own safety.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Bussey felt the defendant's con-
duct amounted to a conscious failure to exercise ordinary care and thus
contributory negligence should not have presented a bar to recovery.
Justice Bussey saw no useful purpose in placing a two by four shoe
across the passageway and felt the defendant should have taken steps
to minimize the hazard created by it.
IX. FRAUD
In Lawson v. Citizens and Southern National Bank,"' the com-
plaint, carefully worded to avoid making a choice among alternative
remedies, in essence charged that the defendant, in developing certain
land for residential purposes, filled in a large gully with stumps and
other improper material and then concealed this defect by capping the
area with clay. This was a case of novel impression in South Carolina
and the supreme court ruled in accord with other states that have acted
upon the particular question, by requiring a duty to disclose land fills.
3 2
The court considered the facts alleged in the complaint sufficient to
state a cause of action for fraud and deceit.
In Paine-Henderson v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc.,34 the plain-
30. See 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 187 (1941); 74 A.L.R. 2d 950 (1960); 65 C.J.S.
Negligence §187 (1950).
31. 180 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1971).
32. 37 Aw. JUR.2d Fraud and Deceit § 160 (1968); 80 A.L.R.2d 1453 (1961).
33. The court noted that the plaintiff was not required to label his cause of action:
When attacked by demurrer for insufficiency of facts, a complaint must
be liberally construed in favor of pleader and sustained if facts alleged, and
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, entitle plaintiff to any relief on
any theory of the case, even though different from that on which he may
have supposed himself entitled to recover.
See also Everette v. White, 245 S.C. 331, 140 S.E.2d 582 (1965); Turbeville v. Gordon,
233 S.C. 75, 103 S.E.2d 521 (1958).
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tiff was induced through advertisements of Grey Advertising, Inc., to
travel from Washington, D.C. to Charleston, South Carolina, via a
through Greyhound bus. He decided to make the return trip by similar
means and was informed by a ticket agent that his 3:45 P.M. bus would
travel directly to Washington. In Richmond, Virginia, the plaintiff was
awakened and told that the bus on which he was riding was going to
New York and would not stop in Washington. The plaintiff was also
informed that his luggage had already been shipped by another bus to
Washington. Upon arriving at his destination, the plaintiff could not
find his luggage and it has not subsequently been found. The plaintiff's
suitcase allegedly contained the only copy of a manuscript of a com-
pleted novel and screenplay.
The defendant, Greyhound Lines, moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that its liability was limited to $50.00 for loss of lug-
gage.3 Notices of liability limits were posted in the terminal and on
plaintiff's claim check. The plaintiff testified that he did not see the
notices in the terminal nor did he read his claim check. Since the matter
in controversy involved interstate commerce, federal law was applica-
ble.36 Uniform liability rates were established by Congress to protect
carriers from exaggerated claims; however, since the contract of car-
riage in Paine-Henderson had been induced by the alleged fraud of the
carrier's agent, the District Court of South Carolina held that the
liability limits would be avoided if fraud was proven. Therefore, after
determining that fraud may have been present defendant's motion for
summary judgment was denied.
In Carter v. Boyd Construction Co.,37 the court restated the nine
elements essential for recovery in a case of actual fraud: (I) a represen-
tation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) either knowledge of its
falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5) intent that the
representation be acted upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity;
(7) the hearer's reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely
thereon; and (9) the hearer's consequent and proximate injury.3"
35. The $50.00 liability limit was provided by the defendant's ". . . [t]arrif duly
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission in accordance with the Carmack
Amendment, 49 U.S.C. Section 20(1!), which was made applicable to motor carriers
by 49 U.S.C. Section 319. . . . The tariff further stated that valuable papers including
manuscripts were carried at the owner's risk."
36. Boston & Me. R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (1914); Mitchell v. Union Pac.
R.R., 188 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
37. 255 S.C. 274, 178 S.E.2d 536 (1971).
38. 255 S.C. at 280-81, 178 S.E.2d at 539.
[Vol. 23
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/14
TORTS SURVEYED
X. LIBEL AND SLANDER
In Neeley v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc.,39 sufficient publication
to sustain actionable libel was found to be lacking. Certain checks
marked "NSF" were accidentally mailed by defendant to the plain-
tiff's address. The defendant intended the checks to be received by
David W. Neeley, but the address of the plaintiff, David A. Neeley was
used. The plaintiff's wife, who had authority to open his mail, inter-
cepted the letter. The court held that the defendant could not reasona-
bly have known that the letter would be opened and read by a person
other than the plaintiff and since no one else saw the letter, there was
no publication. 0
In Neeley, the plaintiff also failed in his burden of proving that
the letter was written to and published concerning him, a requirement
of section 10-676 of the South Carolina Code of Laws." The evidence
indicated the plaintiff, his wife, and the defendant's agent who signed
the letter, all knew that the plaintiff had nothing to do with writing the
bad checks.
In Prentise v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,4" appellant's
husband, in his application for automobile liability insurance, reported
that he had not been involved in an accident within the past five years
and that his wife did not drive his automobile. His policy was cancelled
after a routine check with the Highway Department indicated that
appellant's husband had been involved in an accident two years prior
to the issuance of the policy. An investigative agency also reported to
Nationwide that appellant was a driver of her husband's car and that
she was "mentally retarded. ' 43 Upon request, and consonant with the
state statute,44 the insurer specified in a letter to the insured the reasons
39. 255 S.C. 301, 178 S.E.2d 662 (1971).
40. The court quoted from 92 A.L.R.2d 227 (1963):
Where the sender of libelous matter directed the material to the defamed
only and was not reasonably charged with knowledge that a third person
might 'intercept' and read the libelous matter before it reached the person
allegedly defamed, it has been held that there was no publication of the
libelous matter upon which a civil action for damages could be based.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-676 (1962).
42. 181 S.E.2d 325 (S.C. 1971).
43. Id. at 327. Appellant testified that she was an epileptic and had been treated in
two hospitals and by numerous physicians for her condition.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.54 (Supp. 1966) provides that upon written request
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for policy cancellation, mentioning that certain investigations revealed
that insured's wife was mentally retarded and a driver of his automo-
bile. In an action for alleged libel, the court held that the letter was
privileged communication and the evidence did not support the exist-
ence of express malice or malice in fact necessary to destroy the pri-
vilege.4"
In Duckworth v. First National Bank,46 publication of an alleged
slanderous statement was established through circumstantial evidence.
The case was submitted to the jury to resolve the dispute of whether
bank customers were within earshot range of bank officer's alleged
statement asking respondent who he was trying to swindle. The court
relied on Tobias v. Sumpter Telephone Co.47 where the rule was an-
nounced that publication may be established, in the absence of positive
testimony by a person claiming to have heard the slanderous remark
by:
[Elvidence tending to show that third persons were present
and near enough at the time to hear the words spoken. And evid-
ence of the latter class would be sufficient to take the case to the
jury for them to say whether the words spoken were heard by the
third person present, even though such person should deny having
heard them.48
In Duckworth the court also held that the question of whether the
statement of the bank officer exceeded the privileged occasion was a
question of fact for the jury. The burden was on the appellant bank to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged slanderous
statement was made upon a privileged occasion to rebut the inference
of malice; this the appellant failed to do.49
JEFFERSON BOONE AIKEN. 11
45. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.53 (Supp. 1966).
46. 254 S.C. 563, 176 S.E.2d 297 (1970).
47. 166 S.C. 161, 164 S.E.2d 446 (1932). See also Perott v. Davison-Paxton Co.,
218 S.C. 189, 62 S.E.2d 95 (1950).
48. 166 S.C. at 165, 164 S.E. at448.
49. Cartwright v. Herald Publishing Co., 220 S.C. 492, 68 S.E.2d 415 (1951),
[Vol. 23
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/14
